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Inbound traffic engineering (ITE)—the process of announcing routes
to, e.g., maximize revenue or minimize congestion—is an essential
task for Autonomous Systems (ASes). AS Path Prepending (ASPP) is
an easy to use and well-known ITE technique that routing manuals
show as one of the first alternatives to influence other ASes’ routing
decisions.We observe that origin ASes currently prependmore than
25% of all IPv4 prefixes.
ASPP consists of inflating the BGP AS path. Since the length of
the AS path is the second tie-breaker in the BGP best path selec-
tion, ASPP can steer traffic to other routes. Despite being simple
and easy to use, the appreciation of ASPP among operators and
researchers is diverse. Some have questioned its need, effectiveness,
and predictability, as well as voiced security concerns. Motivated by
these mixed views, we revisit ASPP. Our longitudinal study shows
that ASes widely deploy ASPP, and its utilization has slightly in-
creased despite public statements against it. We surprisingly spot
roughly 6k ASes originating at least one prefix with prepends that
achieve no ITE goal. With active measurements, we show that ASPP
effectiveness as an ITE tool depends on the AS location and the
number of available upstreams; that ASPP security implications are
practical; identify that more than 18% of the prepended prefixes
contain unnecessary prepends that achieve no apparent goal other
than amplifying existing routing security risks. We validate our
findings in interviews with 20 network operators.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many Internet Autonomous Systems (ASes) receive significantly
more traffic than they send. They often use inbound traffic engineer-
ing (ITE) to influence the link through which they receive traffic
based on economic considerations (e.g., transit cost) or operational
demands (e.g., latency, packet loss, capacity). ITE has become even
more important, as there are more options for inter-AS connectivity
due to, e.g., IXPs (Internet eXchange Points), PNIs (Private Network
Interconnects), and an overall increase of peering [9, 58, 71, 74, 75].
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)-enabled ITE techniques include
AS-Path Prepending (ASPP) [15, 22, 76], selective or more-specific
prefix announcements [27], BGP communities [23, 63], or Multi
Exit Discriminator (MED) values [25, 41].
In this paper, we focus on understanding ASPP deployment and
the potential issues associated with it. ASPP is a straightforward,
easy-to-use technique that is often mentioned among the first ITE
techniques by router vendors [19, 21, 26, 35, 43]. It is a technique
where an AS artificially inflates the BGP AS path by inserting (sub-
sequent) duplicate entries of its ASN. Since the length of an AS
path is the second most important tie-breaker in BGP best path se-
lection, ASPP may steer traffic from one route to another. However,
its effect depends on route propagation and the routing decisions
made by other ASes. Despite (or because of) its simplicity and its
inherent limitations, the appreciation of ASPP among operators
and researchers is mixed. On the one hand, ASPP—unlike other ITE
techniques—does not need any support from other ASes, nor deag-
gregatable prefixes. On the other hand, its need, effectiveness, and
predictability have been questioned [37, 50, 65]. In addition, there
have been concerns about the extent to which ASPP can amplify
existing routing insecurities [38, 39, 64], and reports of improper
ASPP configurations triggering bugs in router software [79, 80].
Motivated by the mixed views about the ASPP method, we inves-
tigate the current use of ASPP and find that more than 30% of ASes
use it. Thus, to contribute to an informed discussion, we address
three fundamental questions:
(i) How do ASes use prepending? To put effectiveness and risk
into context, we first identify and characterize the policies ASes
apply (i.e., the number of prepends used for each prefix) when
using ASPP. Even when using data from all route collectors over
the last decade, limited route visibility [16, 29, 47] poses a significant
challenge. We deal with it by conducting interviews with more than
20 operators and by cross-checking our results with private data
sources from large Internet players.
(ii) How effective is prepending? Among both operators and
academics, the opinion on whether ASPP is effective as an ITE
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technique diverges and often depends on the position of an AS
in the routing ecosystem. For example, Quoitin et al. [50] showed
that ASPP is unpredictable using their vantage point. We claim
that the effectiveness of ASPP is indeed diverse—it depends on the
vantage point within the routing system and the number of available
upstreams. We highlight this behavior by actively testing a large
number of vantage points and varying the number of upstreams.
(iii)Does prepending amplify existing routing security risks?
Often, a “malicious” route needs to be the shortest path in order
to be adopted. ASPP facilitates the spreading of malicious routes
by making the legitimate paths longer. While one may observe
malicious routes in public BGP data, the lack of suitable what-
if scenarios (i.e., how would the scenario change with a larger
prepend size) poses a significant challenge. We shed light on this
topic by systematically emulating numerous prefix hijacks from
many vantage points.
We approach these questions using both active and passive mea-
surements. We use passively collected routing information from
Isolario [34], RIPE RIS [1], and RouteViews [2] to perform a longi-
tudinal study. We then use the PEERING testbed [57, 59] to system-
atically explore ASPP from a large number of vantage points and
emulate many scenarios through targeted BGP route announce-
ments and probing traffic.
We summarize our main contributions as follows:
• We perform a longitudinal characterization of ASPP utiliza-
tion and identify that, despite the community mixed opin-
ions, its utilization has been steadily increasing. We find
that, on May 2020, 30% of the ASes prepend at least one of
their prefixes, resulting in 25% of the IPv4 prefixes being
originated with ASPP (see § 4).
• We also identify that ASes mainly originate their prefixes
with two distinct prepending sizes (e.g., without prepend
and with two extra prepends) to indicate their preference
for inbound traffic. Surprisingly, we also find that roughly
6k ASes originate a total of more than 28k prefixes with a
single prepending size (different than zero), thus resulting
in no ITE effect (see § 5).
• We discover that in scenarios with only two upstreams, ASPP
effectiveness is strongly dependent on the vantage point. Yet,
when using many upstreams, ASPP shifts traffic from most
incoming sources (see § 6).
• Using active experiments, we identify that prefixes with
three prepends are highly suitable for prefix hijacking. Today,
ASes originate more than 15k prefixes with at least three
prepends, increasing the risks of widespread route leaks or
prefix hijacking with no apparent ITE benefit (see § 7).
We discuss ethical considerations in Appendix § A, and to foster
reproducibility and research on ASPP, we make all of our analysis
code available to the research community.1
2 PRIMER ON PATH PREPENDING
ASPP is an ITE technique in which an AS adds its own AS number
𝑛 extra times (𝑛 ≥ 1) before originating/propagating a BGP route,
thus artificially increasing the resulting AS-Path length by 𝑛. We
refer to 𝑛 as the prepend size. Whenever an AS receives a route
1https://gitlab.mpi-klsb.mpg.de/lprehn/imc20_aspp
announcement, it chooses the best path according to a list of tie-
breaking rules. The first rule relies on local preference. To affect
the route selection of remote ASes [52], an AS uses ASPP to inflate
the AS Path to influence the second tie-breaking rule: to prefer the
shortest AS path. (If the tie persists, route origin and MED values
are among the remaining tie-breakers.)
In Figure 1a, we illustrate the use of ASPP by an AS with two
neighbors. AS A announces a prefix P to both neighbors with dif-
ferent prepend sizes. By making one path longer, AS A attempts
to influence remote ASes to send traffic through AS B. The success
of this attempt will depend on how remote ASes will receive the
announcements. In Figure 1b, we depict a case where ASPP can
influence the decision of AS F. Even though the path traversing
AS C has fewer ASes than the one going through AS B, AS F prefers
the second path as it is the shortest. In Figure 1c, we show a case
where the ASPP by AS A cannot influence the decision of AS F as
it has fewer prepends—AS F prefers the path traversing AS C as it
has the smallest AS path length. These cases underline that ASPP
cannot guarantee remote route changes and the resulting ingress
traffic distribution.
We distinguish two forms of prepending. If the AS prepending
is the originator, we refer to it as origin-prepending; otherwise, we
refer to it as intermediate-prepending. When an AS prepends on be-
half of another AS, we refer to this particular form of intermediate-
prepending as remote-prepending. In such cases, ASes can use BGP
communities or web interfaces to ask the other ASes to prepend.
ASes use remote-prepending to affect path choices that are beyond
the reach of origin-prepending.
ASes can use ASPP for load balancing among upstreams, to
minimize transit cost (by moving traffic away from an expensive
upstream), or to establish backup links. Among the reasons men-
tioned by operators for ASPP popularity are its ease of use on
commercial routers, its efficiency in steering incoming traffic, and
the requirements and shortcomings of alternate mechanisms.
3 DATASETS AND DATA SANITATION
To analyze ASPP utilization, we rely on (BGP) MRT data publicly
available from Isolario2 [34], RIPE RIS[1], and Route Views [2]. We
use the following datasets in our analyses.
BGPContinuous : This dataset contains RIB snapshots from all avail-
able BGP collectors on March 1st, 2020 at 0:00 UTC+0. In addition,
it contains all subsequent update files until April 1st, 2020, at 0:00
UTC+0. If an update file is missing in a collector’s repository, we
add the next available RIB snapshot to capture potentially missed
changes.
BGPWeekly : This dataset contains data for each Monday between
January 1st, 2018, and May 4th, 2020. For each day, we use the RIB
snapshots from all available BGP collectors at 0:00 UTC+0 and all
consecutive updates for that day. We, again, compensate for missing
files.
BGPMonthly : This dataset contains data for the 15th day of every
month between January 15th, 2010, and April 15th, 2020. We gen-
erate the data of a single day in the same way as for the previous
dataset.
2Isolario was hit by lightning on July 30th, 2019, leading to some missing files until
August 16th, 2019 —we find that the impact to our analysis is minimal.
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Figure 1: AS-Path Prepending behavior.
ROAS: Rather than using tools (such as Routinator [45]) to pre-
process RPKI data, we take advantage of the preprocessed data
provided by Chung et al. [18]. We use data for the same days as in
the BGPWeekly dataset.
RIR: This dataset contains the (extended—if available) delegation
files from AFRINIC [3], APNIC [5], ARIN [6], LACNIC [36], and
RIPENCC [54] for all days in the BGPMonthly dataset.
Data sanitation. Before analyzing our BGP data, we remove well-
known artifacts. First, we remove bogon routes, i.e., routes that
lead only to reserved address space [66] or routes that contain ASes
currently reserved by IANA [33]. Similarly, we remove all routes
to prefixes less specific than /8. This step ensures that we only
analyze default-free routing information.3 We further remove all
routes for which the path contains a loop. The sanitation, up to
this point, removed ~3.36M (0.7 %) routes and reduced the number
of prefixes from ~1.29M to ~932k (-28 %) using the last snapshot
of the BGPWeekly dataset as reference (we find similar values for
other snapshots). To avoid making false inferences due to lack of
visibility, we only analyze prefixes visible by at least one-third of
the BGP monitors set on the corresponding date. When analyzing
how many monitors see each prefix, we find a clear separation
between locally and globally visible prefixes regardless of the exact
year (in Appendix § B we report more details). Notably, the last
step reduced the number of unique prefixes to ~803k.
4 TRENDS IN THE USE OF ASPP
Previously reported metrics about ASPP differ across studies, with
the most recent results being from 2016 [11, 25, 27, 68]. To under-
stand ASPP utilization better, we analyze its trends over the last
decade using the BGPMonthly dataset. We note our numbers repre-
sent lower bounds of the actual ASPP utilization, as (i) the visibility
of route collectors is limited [16, 29, 47]; (ii) prepended paths tend
to be less attractive than non-prepended ones; (iii) we sanitize our
data (see § 3).
One-third of all ASes use origin-prepending. Figure 2 shows
the fraction of ASes using ASPP (for IPv4) separated by prepending
type (recall § 2): origin-prepending or intermediate-prepending. First,
we see that the fraction of ASes using ASPP has increased slightly,
from ~28% (9.4k) on January 15th, 2010 to ~31.4% (21.6k) on April
15th, 2020, with most ASes using origin-prepending. Similarly, we
observe a small increase in intermediate prepending—from 4.7%
(1.6k) on January 15th, 2010, to 5.5% (3.8k) on April 15th, 2020. 4
3As opposed to cases in which an AS uses the default route (i.e., 0.0.0.0/0) to send
traffic to some/all destinations.
4The spike on the fraction of ASes applying intermediate prepending corresponds to
the period in which a set of experiments [63] involving the use of BGP communities
to manipulate ASPP was taking place.
We also see a very small fraction (<1%) using only intermediate
prepending, some of which might be due to ASes offering remote-
prepending, e.g., via BGP communities.
The fraction of prependedprefix-origin pairs and addresses
has increased slightly. Next, we focus on prefixes. We consider a
prefix/IP address as prepended if at least one AS has added its ASN
more than once (consecutively) to the path. In Figure 3 we observe
that the increase of prefixes with origin-prepending is similar to the
one observed respective to ASes—from ~21.3% (65.2k) on January
15th, 2010 to ~25.9% (207.7k) on April 15th, 2020.5 Regarding the
intermediately prepended prefixes, we observe that for the entire
BGPMonthly dataset, (almost) all prefixes contain prepend in all
snapshots. Such a condition happens because there are transit ASes
(especially Tier-1s) that prepend most prefixes before redistributing
them to at least one of their neighbors.
For IP addresses we see a larger increase of origin-prepending—
from ~26.2% (570 million) in January 15th, 2010 to ~38.9% (1.1 billion)
on April 15th, 2020. This more pronounced increase is likely corre-
lated to the exhaustion of the IPv4 address space and the fact that
prefixes more specific than /24 tend to propagate less [49].
To not overestimate the numbers, we check how many of these
addresses are covered by more-specific non-prepended prefixes.6
We find that on April 15th, 2020, only 9.3% of the origin-prepended
address space was reachable through more-specific non-prepended
announcements. We also observe that for 79% of the cases, the less
specific announcements were visible in more monitors than the
more-specific ones, indicating that 9.3% may be an over-estimate.
Discussion. Despite various public call-outs of the drawbacks
of ASPP [37–39, 64], we observe that its use has not decreased.
Most operators were surprised by the results. According to them,
the long-term use of ASPP is a sign of either bad capacity planning
or inexperienced network engineers. Nevertheless, some argued
that many factors might render ASPP more attractive than other
ITE techniques for network operators, including not being able to
obtain an address space larger than a /24 in certain regions (e.g.,
RIPE[55, 56]); the capital required to expand the infrastructure; the
simplicity of ASPP; and its prominence in router vendor handbooks.
Focus on origin-prepending and IPv4. As the large number
of intermediately prepended prefixes is the result of the routing
policies of a small number of large ASes (e.g., Tier-1s), for the
remainder of this paper, we focus on the (far more common) origin-
based prepending. Also, we choose to focus on IPv4 prepending, as
5We also analyzed ASPP growth considering only monitors available on January 15th,
2010 and find similar behavior.
6Recall BGP longest-prefix-matching prefers routes for (non-prepended) more-specific
prefixes over (prepended) less-specific ones.
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Figure 2: Fraction of ASes deploying
ASPP.
Figure 3: Fraction of Prefixes/IPs with
ASPP.
Figure 4: Prefix-origin primary policy
consistency across a month.
IPv6 accounts for only 6% of the total cases of prepending on April
15th, 2020.
5 PREPENDING POLICIES IN THEWILD
To understand how operators use ASPP with the prefixes they
originate, we identify different policies and look at their prevalence
in-the-wild, both in terms of prefix-origin pairs (§ 5.1) and ASes
(§ 5.2). In our analyses, we find a surprising incidence of a seemingly
innocuous form of ASPP, called uniform prepending, which we thus
investigate more closely (§ 5.3). Last, we examine the evolution of
prepending sizes in different geographic service regions (§ 5.4). As
in the previous section, we consider only prefix-origin pairs visible
by at least one-third of all BGP monitors.
5.1 ASPP policies: Prefix-origin pairs
We identify four different prepending policies that can be used in
a prefix-origin pair. They are (i) no-prepend: no visible prepended
route; (ii) uniform: the only visible prepend size is 𝑁 , where 𝑁 > 0;
(iii) binary: visible routes either have prepend size𝑀 or 𝑁 , where
𝑀, 𝑁 ≥ 0 and𝑀 ≠ 𝑁 ; (iv) diverse: the number of different prepend
sizes in the visible routes exceeds two.
ASes tend to stick with a (per-prefix) policy over time. Our
first focus is on policy consistency—how often does an AS change a
prefix prepending policy? For this analysis, we use the BGPContinuous
dataset, in which we identify roughly 2.3 million unique prefix-
origin pairs. For each pair, we define as its primary policy the one we
observe more often throughout the full month (among no-prepend,
uniform, binary and diverse). We examine the stability of the pri-
mary policy for a prefix-origin pair with respect to its visibility
period. Figure 4 shows a heatmap, where colors indicate the number
of pairs in each cell. We observe a concentration in the top right
section of the plot, which corresponds to 54% of prefix-origin pairs,
indicating that they are visible all the time and never change their
primary policy. We repeated the analysis for another month (Sep.
2019) and found similar primary policy stability, which allows us
to adopt weekly (BGPWeekly ) or monthly (BGPMonthly ) snapshots
without any loss in the subsequent analyses.
The use of policies has been stable, with binary policy be-
ing more common. Using the BGPWeekly dataset, we examine the
use of prepending policies for prefix-origin pairs between January
1st, 2018, and May 4th, 2020. In Figure 5, we see that the most com-
mon prepending policy is binary, followed by diverse and uniform
policies. Their popularity remains largely stable, if considering the
proportion to the full set of pairs: diverse increased from 4.5% (30k)
to 6.1% (50k), binary decreased from 17.2% (114k) to 15.9% (131k),
while uniform remained at 3.6% (24.4k to 29.4k)7. We note that
the trend regarding the use of more fine-grained policies might be
related to the increasing connectivity level of ASes (e.g., connect-
ing to more IXPs). For the sake of comparison, we looked at the
use of uniform prepending back in January 2010, and it was 2.7%
(8.2k). The consistent presence of uniform policy through time is
surprising since, in theory, it should not influence any remote BGP
decisions. We take a closer look at this phenomenon in § 5.3.
Moreprepending duringCOVID-19 lockdown.Wealso note
that between February and April of 2020, the number of prefix-
origin pairs with ASPP reached approximately 30% (4% increase).
Such a peak is likely related to the lockdown measures due to
COVID-19, which resulted in people staying more time at home [28,
72, 73]. In this period there have been reports of traffic increases [4,
20, 44], which also resulted in content providers such as Netflix and
Youtube stopping streaming in 4k to save bandwidth [31].
We believe that the higher use of ASPP during this period was
necessary for network operators to handle the increasing demands
of traffic while upgrading their links (as ASPP use has decreased
in May). When we discussed this with network operators, some of
them mentioned that they were observing more use of ASPP, espe-
cially during large live events streamed on Youtube [42], and that
some of their transit customers were requesting capacity upgrades.
7In May 4th, 2020, all types of prepending combined represented 25.6% of all prefix-
origin pairs, corroborating findings in § 4.
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Figure 5: Prefix-origin: Fractions
through time of visible prefixes per
ASPP policy.
Figure 6: Mixed policy ASes grouped by
# of prefixes.
Figure 7: Fractions of prepending poli-
cies through time for a fixed set of
uniform-prepend prefixes.
5.2 ASPP policies: ASes
We now change the perspective of our policy analysis to ASes. We
differentiate per-AS ASPP policies as follows. When an AS employs
a single policy for all prefixes it originates, we say it adopts one
of the four policies already defined: no-prepend, uniform, binary or
diverse. Otherwise, we say an AS employs a mixed set of policies.
Most ASes that prepend use multiple policies. Using the
BGPWeekly dataset, we analyze the use of AS prepending policies
between January 1st, 2018, and May 4th, 2020. We observe that
more than 30.8% (20.8k) of the ASes prepend at least one prefix
they originate (consistently with § 4), and most ASes use mixed
prepending policies on May 4th, 2020. Among those using a single
policy, the most common case is the binarypolicy, followed by
uniform and diverse, respectively. Over time the fractions of different
policies are substantially stable, with only a slight increase in all
but binary policies. (In May 4th, 2020 we observe the following
percentages: uniform 2.5%, diverse 1.4%, mixed 16.4%, and binary
10.4%). Once again, we note an increase in fine-grained prepending
policies, which may be associated with a general increase in AS
connectivity. We consider conceptually more straightforward for
an AS to employ a single policy. Nevertheless, ITE may require
the AS to use mixed policies, such as binary for some prefixes and
no-prepend for others.
ASes withmixed policies mainly use binary policies. Next,
we focus on ASes using a mixed set of policies and analyze the
fraction of prefixes using each of the prepending policies. We group
these few ASes according to the number of originated prefixes, in
four “bins”: 1− 10, 11− 100, 101− 1000, 1000+ prefixes. For each AS
in a bin, we calculate the fraction of prefixes for each policy and
present it as a boxplot in Figure 6 for May 4th, 2020 (we observe
similar behavior for other snapshots). The plot shows only ASes
that employ a mixed set of policies8, and we observe that for these
ASes, the most common is the binary policy (in all bins). We also
find, confirming our intuition, that the fraction of the diverse policy
8The same plot for different dates, namely all snapshots of the BGPWeekly dataset
showed similar results.
increases with the number of prefixes an AS originates (more pro-
nounced for the two larger bins). Conversely, we see the fraction
of uniformly prepended prefixes decreasing (with AS size).
5.3 Uniform prepending
Uniform prepending is widespread. There is no apparent rea-
son for an AS to use the same prepending size for all its neigh-
bors when originating a prefix, as it implies no differentiation
among them. Nevertheless, on May 4th, 2020, we observe more
than 29k (3.6%) uniformly prepended prefix-origin pairs originated
by 5.8k (8%) ASes, out of which 1.7k (2.5%) ASes prepend all their
prefixes uniformly.
Some prefixes use the uniformpolicy consistently. The use
of uniform policy might be the result of temporary events. To de-
termine whether this is a common case, we pick all the (25.8k)
uniformly-prepended prefix-origin pairs on a specific date (Decem-
ber 31st, 2018), and use the BGPWeekly dataset to show the fractions
of policy type change for these prefixes in the preceding/following
months. Figure 7 shows that the total number of prefixes decreases
both sides, as up to 20% prefixeswere not visible earlier or stop being
visible afterward. We observe that both before and after December
31st, 2018 the fractions of no-prepend, binary, and diverse (for this
fixed set of prefix-origin pairs) increase while uniform decreases.
In other words, for some of these prefixes, uniform prepending was
temporary. On the other hand, for the entire period, we see at least
50% of prefix-origin pairs using the uniform policy. Since there is no
guarantee that these are the same prefixes, we look into it further.
Between January 1st, 2018, and May 4th, 2020, we observe 1.16M
prefix-origin pairs in our BGPWeekly dataset. Out of these, 108k
prefixes are uniformly prepended in at least one snapshot, and 3.4k
(originated by 1.1k ASes) use this policy the entire time—henceforth
referred to as consistently uniform. We also note that another 13.1k
(originated by 4.3k ASes) are uniformly prepended for at least one
year, continuously. Thus, counter-intuitively, we find that a sub-
stantial number of ASes, roughly 6% on the Internet, are making
consistent use of uniform prepending.
IMC ’20, October 27–29, 2020, Virtual Event, USA Pedro Marcos et al.
Uniform prefix prepending is dominated by small ASes.
How large are those interesting cases of ASes uniformly prepending
all their prefixes? To answer this question, we determine the total
number of prefixes each of these ASes originate. Taking May 4th,
2020, as an example, there were 848 (out of 1717) ASes with only
a single prefix. Another 767 ASes originated between 2 and 10
prefixes, and 89 ASes, between 11 and 50. The remaining 13 ASes
originated more than 50 prefixes, all of them uniformly prepended,
with the largest one originating 379 prefixes. Among the larger ASes
(with 50+ prefixes), we identified a large online social network, two
universities, and several ISPs. These ASes are from North America,
South America, and Asia.
We then check for how long these ASes used the uniform policy.
We find that 6k ASes (out of 74k that we observe when combining all
snapshots) uniformly prepend all prefixes in at least one snapshot,
and 263 ASes used this policy between January 1st, 2018, and May
4th, 2020. We also see that other 716 ASes uniformly prepended all
their prefixes for at least one year. From the group of 13 ASes that on
May 4th, 2020, were uniformly prepending all of their 50+ prefixes,
we find the following: one AS used it at least since January 1st, 2018,
five for at least the past two years, one for the past 22 months, three
for at least one year. The others consecutively prepended between
2 and 5 months.
We account for potential artifacts when measuring uni-
form prepending. Even though our sanitation ensures global visi-
bility of all prefixes, missing interconnections may cause prefixes
to incorrectly appear as uniformly prepended. There might be ad-
ditional private network interconnects and peering links that are
not visible to the BGP monitoring infrastructure [16, 47, 75]. We
use two different approaches for cross-checking the results. First,
we use bdrmapIT [40], a state-of-the-art tool, to infer intercon-
nections based on public traceroutes from CAIDA’s Archipelago
(Ark) [12] between March 25th, 2020 and April 4th, 2020. We picked
Ark traceroutes as it contains measurements to each /24 sub prefix
from multiple vantage points. We then compare the list of intercon-
nections from bdrmapIT with the ones we observe in our snapshot
from March 30th, 2020 (the mid-point of our traceroutes). On our
reference date (March 30th, 2020), 5.8k ASes were originating at
least one prefix uniformly prepended. With bdrmapIT, we identify
additional interconnection links for 1.7k (29%) of these ASes. Nev-
ertheless, for the other 71% ASes originating uniformly prepended
prefixes, bdrmapIT did not add any additional links. For the 263
ASes that uniformly prepended all their prefixes in all snapshots of
the BGPWeekly dataset, we identify new links for only 18 of them.
We note that even though we identify new links, we cannot draw
any inference regarding the BGP announcements made through
those links.
The second cross-check is to increase our visibility into the BGP
routing system with data from two large global CDNs (each con-
nected to more than 200 peering infrastructures) and one regional
CDN present in more than 25 peering infrastructures. We choose
CDNs since they have many private peering interconnections and
need excellent visibility within the routing system for their opera-
tions. When checking their private data for all prefixes uniformly
prepended in all snapshots of the BGPWeekly dataset, we observe
more diverse policies for only 51 of those prefixes. Thus, we can
conclude that our inferences are valid for the vast majority of the
uniform cases.
Some of these prefixes carry large volumes of traffic. Some
operators mentioned that consistently uniformly prepended pre-
fixes might only carry little traffic, reducing the need to care about
them. To check this hypothesis, we use a large European IXP as
our vantage point on April 28th, 2020. We check the traffic volumes
to and from each of the consistently uniformly prepended prefixes
and observe that some of them carry as much traffic as prefixes of
large social networks.9
To provide a picture of the traffic associated with all consistently
uniformly prepended prefixes in our vantage point, Figure 8 shows
the fraction of bytes flowing towards each prefix (as well as in both
directions) relative to the prefix with the most significant amount of
traffic. For 57% of the prefixes, we do not observe any traffic towards
them, and for 35%, we observe traffic from them, but not towards
them. We note that only a few prefixes (<2%) carry representative
volumes of traffic, either considering one or both directions. The
vast majority of the prefixes we observe carry small volumes of
traffic. While we cannot guarantee that other vantage points would
observe similar numbers, we can conclude that, contrary to network
operators’ intuition, some of the consistently uniformly prepended
prefixes carry substantial traffic volumes.
Many plausible causes for uniform prepending. Is there
any practical explanation for the use of uniform prepending? We in-
vestigate this aspect by interviewing network operators, and report
here a summary of potential causes: Loss of a neighbor: an AS may
have used ASPP to differentiate between multiple upstreams but
later terminated the relationship with some. Indeed, we observe
that many (77% on May 4th, 2020) of the uniformly prepended
prefixes are propagated via a single neighbor. Lack of knowledge:
A reoccurring opinion is that many network operators, especially
from small ASes, have limited understanding of BGP. Indeed, our
analysis showed that many of the cases of uniform prepending were
from small ASes. Procrastination for stability: Some network opera-
tors know about the presence of ASPP but are reluctant to remove
it, out of fear of negatively affecting their reachability and/or rout-
ing stability in general. Good news travels fast—bad news, slowly:
Some operators indicated that uniform prepending may help im-
plement ITE policies when needed quickly. Instead of waiting to
insert prepends when some change is needed, an AS can prepend
in advance, and when the time comes, remove from one upstream
to indicate a preferred route. Since “good news” travel fast, such
an approach provides faster BGP convergence. Sibling artifacts:
One operator pointed out that there might be cases in which two
or more sibling ASes originate the same prefix, but with different
prepending policies. We analyze this possibility using the CAIDA
AS2Org dataset [14] and the data from May 4th, 2020. We find 17
cases in which two or more sibling ASes individually announced
the same prefix, one uniformly prepended and the other with a
different policy, resulting in a non-uniform policy. Strikingly, in 16
out of 17 cases, one of the ASes announces using uniform and the
other one with a different policy. In one case, both ASes originate
the prefix uniformly prepended, but with different prepending sizes.
Other ASes ignoring prepends: One operator argued that uniform
9We are not allowed to disclose the actual byte counts of each prefix.
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Figure 8: Uniform prefix-origin IXP traf-
fic on April 28, 2020. Figure 9: Prefix-origin: Prepend size by region across time.
prepending might even lead to the desired traffic shift due to route-
optimizers ignoring all prepends on one upstream and not on the
others.
Looking at two relevant cases of uniform prepending. To
validate our observations and to understand some of the actual
reasons why ASes uniformly prepend their prefixes, we reached
out to network operators from two ASes that have been originating
uniformly prepended prefixes for more than one year.10 One is a
regional ISP that uniformly prepends 25 prefixes (out of 100+), while
the other is a large online social network uniformly prepending
all its 80+ prefixes. The operators from the regional ISP confirmed
that the uniform prepending was unintentional and attributed it to
legacy configurations and changes to their upstreams. The large
online social network also confirmed that they were using uniform
prepending unintentionally: the prepends are a result of how their
internal routing platform operates. Since then, none of these ASes
have removed the uniform prepends.
5.4 Prepending sizes
We use the BGPMonthly dataset to track if ASes changed the num-
ber of prepends they use over time. Since different service regions
have distinct characteristics (e.g., availability of peering infrastruc-
tures [69]), we analyze them individually. We use the delegation
files from the Routing Information Registries (RIRs) to identify the
prefix region. While we acknowledge that there might be some
misclassification, e.g., for global ASes, transferred prefixes, or due
to IPv4 address delegations, we expect it to provide valid data for
most prefixes. For each prefix, we analyze its minimum (non-zero)
and maximum prepend size, i.e., if an ASes originates a prefix with
0, 2, and 3 prepends, its minimum prepended size is 2, and its maxi-
mum is 3. Figure 9 shows the results as a set of subplots, one for
each service region and year. Each subplot shows a histogram for
both the minimum (green) and maximum (purple) prepend sizes
10We note that not all ASes are interested in discussing aspects of their operational
practices. While discussing with network operators might not be enough for general-
ization, their comments allow us to provide insights regarding uniformly prepended
prefixes.
across all prepended prefixes. The blue bars represent the overlap
between the green and the purple bars.
Prepending sizes are polarized and consistent among re-
gions. We observe that the prepending size distributions for ARIN
and RIPE, which hardly change during the decade, are polarized:
most prefixes either have a prepending size of one or at least four.11
LACNIC and AFRINIC are different: in 2010, there is no polarization,
with a substantial number of prefixes with at least four prepends,
while in 2020 polarization happens with a more significant inci-
dence of prepending of size one. The change happens gradually
over time, but in AFRINIC, the period 2014–2017 was an exception:
prepending sizes varied “rapidly” and somewhat unpredictably.
Towards 2020, the observable differences between the service re-
gions become negligible—they are all polarized. In APNIC, the span
between max and min prepend sizes increased, indicating more
polarization, with an even more fine-grained set of prepending
policies.
When we discussed these results with operators, they pointed
out that the Internet infrastructure changed significantly through-
out the decade, particularly for LACNIC and AFRINIC. Before 2015,
many routes within Africa took long inter-continental detours [30].
In order to use intra-continental paths whenever possible, ASes
resorted to excessive prepending. With the increased availability of
IXPs and peering within each region, intra-continental path diver-
sity increased [24]. This may have reduced the need for excessive
prepending, thus reducing prepend sizes.
6 EVALUATING ASPP EFFECTIVENESS
Given the widespread use of ASPP, in this section we explore the
propagation of prepended routes and how effective ASPP is today.
Prependedpaths propagate less thannon-prepended ones.
The common assumption is that the larger the prepend size of a
route is, the less a network operator will expect it to propagate.
Thus, prepending should mainly affect routing in the local neighbor-
hood of an AS. To investigate how prepended prefixes propagate,
11In July 2019, we spot an AS originating four prefixes with 905 prepends, which is
the maximum number of prepends we observe in our datasets.
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Figure 10: Fraction of ASes adopting
longer alternative.
Figure 11: Fraction of potentially mov-
able targets.
Figure 12: Fraction of actually moved
targets.
we analyze all prefixes with a binary prepending policy where the
prefix originator has not prepended one of the alternatives. For
each prefix, we compute the fraction of ASes (out of those that
we observe propagating the prefix) that propagate each alterna-
tive. Figure 10 shows the results for May 4th, 2020 (we observe
a similar behavior for other snapshots). We observe that in 70%
of the analyzed cases, independently from the prepend size, the
prepended alternative traverses fewer ASes than the non-prepended
one. While it may seem that the prepend size has no direct effect
on route propagation, a more plausible explanation is that the ASes
are tuning their prepend size to control how far the prefixes can
propagate. Figure 10 shows that the distributions of the intended
scopes of propagation are quite similar for different prepending
sizes.
Nevertheless, it is unclear to which extent the adoption of a
prepended path impacts the actual traffic flow, since (a) different
routers in an AS may pick different preferred paths, (b) BGP mon-
itors cover only a subset of ASes, and (c) some ASes might even
remove ASPP (see § 7.1). Thus, we run active measurement ex-
periments using the PEERING testbed as our vantage point. The
PEERING testbed offers unique possibilities for our experiments.
First, it operates on a geographically diverse set of locations—we
refer to each location as Point of Presence (PoP). Second, each PoP
has a diverse set of upstreams—the number of upstreams and the
degree of connectivity of the individual upstreams differ among
PoPs. Third, the PEERING testbed allows us to originate probing
traffic towards a diverse set of targets using ICMP, TCP, and UDP.
On an abstract level, we create a scenario where we announce
a route with prepends for some upstreams and no prepends (pre-
ferred) for others. Then, we use ICMP/TCP/UDP ping probes to-
wards a diverse set of targets to generate response traffic towards
the PEERING testbed AS. If the traffic enters via one of the preferred
ASes, we refer to the result as a “hit”, otherwise as a “miss”. We
note that the PEERING testbed allows us to correctly identify in
which of the POPs the response has arrived.
Target selection. We base our target selection on Rapid 7’s list
of HTTP/1.1 GET responses [51]. We first select only IP addresses
that responded with the HTTP status code “200 OK” when queried
by an HTTP/1.1 GET request. To sample a diverse set of targets, we
first map IPs to ASes by performing a longest prefix match on the
closest snapshot of our BGPWeekly data set. Afterward, we classify
ASes as follows: (i) we use a public list [70] to identify Tier-1 ASes;
(ii) we use CAIDA’s AS type classification [13] to identify “Content”
and “Enterprise” ASes; (iii) we identify the remaining ASes as either
“Access” or “Transit”—based on whether we observe them only as
origin ASes in the BGPWeekly snapshot12. Since the Tier-1 class only
contains 23 ASes, we use all of them as target ASes. For each of the
remaining classes, we sampled 250 target ASes, resulting in 1023
targeted ASes. By running our own GET requests, we make sure to
select only ASes for which 20 different IPs respond, resulting in a
final target set of 20460 IP addresses.
Upstream selection.While the PEERING testbed has hundreds
of upstreams, only roughly 20 provide transit. Since ASPP will have
no effect if the prefix is subject to prefix aggregation [52] by a
remote AS, we check how “well” our prefix propagates. We then
announce it in one upstream per time and check how many mon-
itors observe the prefix without aggregation. We filter out those
upstreams that propagate our prefix to less than 200 monitors after
30 minutes of convergence. After this step, 11 transit providers—
present at 10 different PoPs—remain. For the sake of simplicity, we
focus on only one transit provider per PoP. We use the following
PoPs: Amsterdam (A), Clemson University (C), Georgia Institute of
Technology (GA), GRnet (GR), Northeastern University (N), Seat-
tle (S), UFMG (UF), Utah (UT), University of Washington (UW), and
University of Wisconsin (W).
Experiments. Each experiment employs a pair of PoPs, and we
repeat it for all combinations and for different sizes of prepending
(none, one, two, and three). We then run three sets of experiments.
In the first set, we pick one upstream from each PoP and announce
our test prefix on both—one with prepending and one without
prepending. In the second set, we announce the prefix to all up-
streams, prepending for all but one. In the last set of experiments,
we announce the prefix to all upstreams but prepend to only one.
12All those ASes are in the “Access/Transit” class in CAIDA’s classification.
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Figure 13: Hitrates by protocol and tar-
get class.
Figure 14: Hitrates when prepending 1
(top)|N-1 (bottom) PoPs.
Figure 15: Prefix-origin: Pairs with at
least 𝑋 prepends.
We refer to specific choices of prepending size, upstreams, and
experiment-class as an iteration. Our experiments took place be-
tween August 27th, 2020, and September 21st, 2020.
Iteration schedules.We deploy two similar iteration schedules
that only differ in their first two rounds of announcements. For the
“Post”-schedule, we start each iteration announcing our prefix 𝑃 via
all upstreams without any prepending. After waiting 15 minutes
to allow BGP to converge, we announce 𝑃 with 𝑋 prepends via
the chosen upstream (Appendix § C shows a detailed graphical
timeline). For the “Pre”-schedule, we do the opposite: we first an-
nounce 𝑃 with 𝑋 prepends via the chosen upstream; we wait for
15 minutes, and finally, announce 𝑃 without prepending via all but
the chosen upstream. We employ both schedules to contain the
impact of route age as a tie-breaking factor. We wait another 15
minutes for both schedules for BGP convergence before starting a
25 minutes long probing period. Each probe consists of ICMP, TCP,
and UDP pings since the transport protocol can potentially bias
the forwarding path [7, 48]. We probe once per minute all targets.
To reduce probing bursts, we spread the packets evenly across the
one minute time interval. To enable targets to opt-out, we embed
our contact information in the payload of every probe. The cleanup
phase starts 30 minutes after the start of the probing phase. Thus,
we have a 5-minute break to ensure that the last responses can
arrive before we withdraw the prefix. To allow for BGP to converge
and minimize the risk of BGP Route Flap Damping, we wait for 30
minutes before starting a new iteration.
Data cleaning. In our results, we only consider those targets
for which we see a significant number of responses: we require at
least 10 of 25 probes for each protocol to be successful. However,
we notice multiple probing artifacts, including many duplicates,
additional ICMP packets, and RST packets. Thus, we first clean our
data in the following manner: (i) we remove duplicate packets by
relying on ICMP and TCP sequence numbers—since we sent SYN-
packets, we receive duplicate TCP SYN-ACKs and RESET packets
caused by receiver timeouts; (ii) we only consider ECHO-REPLY
ICMP packets—we remove, in particular, ICMP TYPE 3 (destination
port unreachable) for UDP and TCP probes; (iii) we hardly get any
responses to the UDP probes, hence, we do not further consider
them; (iv) for a given iteration, we remove all targets for which we
receive responses via multiple interfaces—this can, e.g., occur if an
AS uses load balancing. Overall, these steps remove less than 3% of
the unique iteration-target combinations for ICMP and TCP.
Locationmatterswhen using only two upstreams. First, we
look at how different prepending sizes influence routing behavior
when using only two upstreams. Figure 11 shows the ECDF for the
fraction of potentially movable targets (i.e., those targets initially
routed via the later prepended upstream) per iteration and iteration
type. We observe that our tested upstream-pairs cover the entire
spectrum of scenarios, i.e., few, medium, and many potentially
movable targets. Given this insight, we investigate how many of
the potentially movable targets have been moved by each prepend
size. Figure 12 shows an ECDF for the fraction of actually moved
targets (based on the number of potentially movable targets) per
PoP combination. We observe that the effectiveness of prepending
can strongly depend on the location (for around 20% of cases, ASPP
has moved no targets, while for another 20% , it moved almost all
targets). We further observe that the change from a prepend of
size one to a prepend of size two has a much larger impact than
the change from size two to three. While we observed that the
Pre-schedule performs slightly better than the Post-schedule (see
the effectiveness of the maximum prepend size for both schedule
types in the figure), the route age did not significantly affect our
results. When manually looking into our data, we observe that for
some pairs, the traffic shifts can happen either way (e.g., GRnet
and Northeastern University), whereas for others, prepending has
little effect (e.g., for Georgia Institute of Technology and Clemson
University). The lack of effectiveness of ASPP might be caused
by the low connectivity degree of the ASes. However, we observe
a different result for Northeastern University despite the same
number of upstream providers of Clemson University and Georgia
Institute of Technology. This highlights that location (not only
connectivity) plays an essential role in the effectiveness of ASPP.
In addition, we observe that traffic shifts, in most cases, are not
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gradual; instead, there is a minimum prepend size necessary to shift
a majority of the targets.
Effectiveness differs based on the target class. Based on the
above results, we study if the probing protocol and target class
change the effectiveness of ASPP. Figure 13 shows a box plot of
per-target hit rates (i.e., fraction of experiments where the target
was a hit) per prepend size, network type, and transport protocol.
Comparing the top plot with the one at the bottom, highlights that
the overall hit rates are the same for both protocols. Comparing
the different network classes, shows that Tier-1 targets were the
hardest to influence using ASPP; however, the difference between
target classes is not statistically significant.
Withmany upstreams, ASPP is able to shift almost all tar-
gets consistently. Finally, we analyze prepending’s effectiveness
for more than two upstreams (second and third sets of experi-
ments). Figure 14 shows the hit rate per PoP when only one PoP
is prepended (top) or when all other PoPs are prepended (bottom).
In the experiments in which all but one upstream use prepending
(bottom plot), we observe that, except for few cases, even small
prepending sizes steer all traffic to the non-prepended upstream.
The same holds for the inverse (top plot). If only a single PoP
prepends, its hit rate quickly drops with increasing prepend size;
however, it never drops to zero.
Discussion. In conclusion, with only two upstreams, the effec-
tiveness of ASPP is strongly dependent on the location within the
routing ecosystem; whereas with many upstreams, ASPP is able to
shift almost all targets consistently. This notion is consistent with
our conversations with operators. On the one hand, a few operators
told us that certain ASes (mostly CDNs) might ignore prepends
during their best-route selection, leading to limited effectiveness.
On the other hand, many operators claimed that prepending works
well for their networks most of the time, highlighting that ASPP is
indeed useful for certain ASes.
7 SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
In this section, we shed light on some of the security concerns
of ASPP that the community recently brought to network oper-
ators’ attention [37–39, 64]. We first analyze if ASes manipulate
prepended paths, i.e., remove prepends. Then, we experimentally
verify and evaluate—on the Internet—the potential impact of hijack-
ing of prepended prefixes as a basis for discussing the increased
vulnerability of prepended prefixes. Finally, we estimate if ASes
that prepend their prefixes also use RPKI-based Route Origin Vali-
dation (ROV) to protect their prefixes against hijacks.
7.1 Is removing prepends a common case?
When propagating routes, ASes should prepend their ASN at least
once and keep the remaining AS path unchanged [52]. Nevertheless,
no mechanism prevents an AS from modifying the path. Indeed,
there have been reports about ASes (possibly) removing prepends
from paths [77]. An AS might remove (all) prepends from a path to
create a shorter path and potentially attract more traffic. Besides
malicious behavior (i.e., for traffic inspection), potential reasons
include economics (e.g., to earn revenue by trying to increase the
95th-percentile of the exchanged traffic [46, 60]) and performance
(e.g., to adapt traffic flow).
Consider the scenario of Figure 1b, where AS A announces the
prefix P to its two upstreams (AS B and AS C). AS B receives the
non-prepended route, while AS C receives a route with three extra
prepends. AS A would expect that most of the traffic towards prefix
P would arrive on the link with AS B. Now suppose that AS C
intends to increase its revenue. If AS C removes (all) prepends
added by AS A, it makes its route shorter and more attractive to
others.
Methodology.We check if we can observe such behavior hap-
pening systematically in the wild.We perform active measurements,
since using passive BGP data to infer path manipulations is difficult
(e.g., due to lack of visibility). Using the PEERING testbed, between
May 3rd, 2020 and May 12th, 2020, we announce our prefix with
three prepends via one of the PEERING’s upstreams, and 30 minutes
later, we withdraw it. After the withdrawal, we wait for another 30
minutes before starting a new iteration using a different upstream.
After iterating through all available upstreams, we analyze all BGP
updates (visible at route collectors) for our prefix. If we identify an
update where at least one prepend is missing, wemark the upstream
for further analysis. In the end, we do an in-depth experiment for
the marked upstreams (that removed at least one prepend). For
each of these, we announce a prepended path and wait 15 minutes
for BGP to converge. Then we manually inspect the chosen best
routes via BGP looking glasses and route servers to identify which
AS is likely the one that is removing prepends. Then, we withdraw
the prefix. After 45 minutes, we check the next marked upstream.
We announce our prefix using 231 different upstreams, resulting in
more than 22k observed paths and 738 traversed ASes.
Prepending removal is rare. After manual investigation, we
find that a single AS removed prepends, on a single path (in a
previous run of this experiment, in September 2019, we found three
ASes consistently removing prepends). We cannot attribute this to
malicious behavior, as we learned from conversations with network
operators that some route optimizers might remove prepends.
7.2 Can ASPP “ease” prefix hijackings?
By artificially increasing the AS path length, an AS makes a route
“less attractive” to other ASes. However, this behavior may create
opportunities for other ASes to hijack this prefix for a larger part
of the Internet ecosystem, since longer paths are more suitable
for prefix hijacking [8]. Recall the scenario of Figure 1b. Let us
assume an AS X (un)intentionally originates a path for prefix P
that contains AS A as the first hop. ASes that use a prepended path
are more likely to adopt this new route (originated by AS X ) since
it is shorter than the one originally propagated by AS C. Possible
variations of this scenario reflect different prefix hijacking types
(e.g., using an illegitimate origin, or manipulating the path so that
the malicious AS is next to the actual origin AS [17, 61]) and route
leaks [32, 62]. In all these scenarios, a “bad” route may replace a
legitimate prepended route.
Routes with at least three prepends are more vulnerable
to prefix hijacking. Recall that there have been reports that ASPP
may increase the risk of prefix hijacking [37, 38, 64]. To better
understand to which extent different lengths of ASPP facilitate the
adoption of hijacked routes, we performed an experiment using the
PEERING testbed.
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Figure 16: Hijacking: Fraction of BGP monitors adopting a hijacked route.
Figure 17: Fraction of prepended pre-
fixes with ROAS.
We ran our measurements between January 13th, 2020, and
January 17th, 2020. In each round, we announce our prefix using
two different ASNs as originators. We first announce it via one
of the PEERING’s PoPs to all attached upstreams using AS61574
as originator and 0, 1, 2, or 3 prepends. Then, 15 minutes later,
we also announce the same prefix via a second PEERING PoP to
all its upstreams without prepends using AS61575.13 30 minutes
after the second announcement, we withdraw all routes for the
prefix. 30 minutes later, we repeat the experiment using a different
combination of PoPs and/or number of prepends. We select PoPs
based on their location and number of upstreams: Amsterdam, 44;
Seattle, 33; GaTech, 4; GRnet, 4; and Clemson, 1. To capture the
prefix hijack’s impact, we analyze the fraction of BGP monitors
that adopted the “hijacked route” via AS61575.
Figure 16 shows the fraction of monitors that adopted the hi-
jacked route per pair of PoPs and prepend size. The results confirm
the intuition that the likelihood of prefix hijacking succeeding in-
creases with the number of prepends. Overall, we find that if the
initial announcement used three prepends, at least 94% of the mon-
itors adopted the hijacked route, even when the hijacking location
only has single upstream (e.g., Clemson). Still, connectivity plays a
vital role in the success of prefix hijacking. For all cases where we
attempted to hijack the prefix from Amsterdam (a highly connected
PoP), we succeeded for at least 93% of the monitors. In contrast,
when we hijack via Clemson (a poorly connected PoP), we only suc-
ceed if the other PoP is prepending three times. Except for Clemson,
all other PoPs were able to hijack Seattle mostly. Also, Seattle (with
33 upstreams) had less success in hijacking routes unless they had
three prepends, which highlights the complexities of the Internet
routing ecosystem.
Our results using a uniform prepending policy are an indication
of how ASPP can increase the success of a hijacking attempt. While
in § 5 we show that ASes uniformly prepend many prefixes, most
ASes use a binary or diverse prepending policy, whereby one route is
often not prepended. This means that the increased risk of hijacking
13The PEERING testbed requires us to add AS47065 after the originating AS to the AS
path.
only applies to the part of the Internet that chooses the prepended
route.
More than 18% of prepended prefixes include apparently
unnecessary prepending, which increases their exposure to
hijacking and route leaks.
While for most prepended prefixes (169k) the minimum prepend
size is 0, still many ASes originate prefixes with at least one prepend
to all their neighbors, which can increase their exposure to hijacks
and/or route leaks. For example, on May 4th, 2020, 6.9k ASes origi-
nated 38.5k prefixes with this characteristic (18.6% of all prepended
prefixes). Among these, 29.4/7.4/2k used a uniform, binary, diverse
policy. All these routes contain at least one unnecessary prepend—
all their policies can be implemented with less prepending (at least
as observable at the BGP monitors).14 To further understand such
potential risks, we use the BGPWeekly dataset to analyze the mini-
mum prepending size for all prepended prefixes. Based on results in
Figure 15, we see that the above finding holds across time, and also
that the number of affected prefixes has grown.
7.3 RPKI-covered prepended prefixes
One of the main techniques for enhancing routing security is
RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure). RPKI allows ASes to
create ROAs (Route Origination Authorizations) for each of their
prefixes that other ASes can use to validate routes using ROV (Route
Origin Validation) [18, 53, 67]. Although ROV cannot avoid the re-
moval of prepends (see § 7.1), it can protect against prefix hijacking
attacks in which the hijacker alters the origin AS [17, 61]. Given
that ASPP potentially increases the exposure during hijacking at-
tacks, we analyze to which degree prepended prefixes are protected
by ROAs.
Most prepended prefixes are not covered by ROAs.We use
the ROAS dataset to check which of the prepended prefixes in the
BGPWeekly dataset has a ROA object. Figure 17 shows the coverage
by ROAs of all prefixes in which all alternatives contain prepend
and for those prefixes without prepend (none).
14We confirmed this conclusion in our conversations with network operators.
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We observe first that the fraction of prefixes covered by ROAs
has been increasing in the past years. On the other hand, we note
that no more than 25% of the prefixes in each prepending class have
ROAs15. This indicates that most prepended prefixes are not even
partially protected against prefix hijacking attacks, regardless of
the minimum number of prepends.
Discussion. Our security related results confirmed the assump-
tions that most network operators shared with us. Nevertheless,
some of them argued that coming close to a specific traffic distri-
bution may be more important to some ASes than reducing the
potential impact of prefix hijacks—especially with the added secu-
rity due to the increasing ROV deployment.
8 RELATEDWORK
Previous studies already focused on characterizing ASPP, under-
standing its effectiveness, and pointing out possible security as-
pects.
Characterization. To understand the characteristics of ASPP, pre-
vious work analyzed the view of ISPs [25], IXPs [10], and route
collectors [11, 27, 68, 78]. Since their numbers were inconsistent,
we refreshed and extended their findings by performing a 10-year
analysis of the main properties of ASPP. In addition, our work is the
first that focuses on prepending policies rather than only utilization
rates.
Effectiveness. Swinnen et al. found—in simulations based on a
degree-based network model—that ASPP cannot always move all
traffic [65]. This finding was later confirmed in 2004 by Quoitin
et al. when running measurements from a single vantage point
connected to two upstreams [50] (similar to our effectiveness mea-
surements). In contrast to their methodologies, we emulated and
tested more than 100 real-world location combinations and showed
that the effectiveness of ASPP varies substantially by location and
the number of upstreams through which an AS announces the
prepended prefix.
Security. Zhang et al. analyzed the potential of interception-attacks
exploiting ASPP based on simulations on an AS Graph extracted
from the public BGP data of RouteViews and RIPE RIS [77]. They
show that well-connected ASes (e.g., Tier-1 ASes) are less prone
to this type of attack and that longer prepends amplify their risks.
We actively measure the security impact that ASPP has based on
hijack emulations from various locations and experiments to iden-
tify ASes that remove prepends; we also observed that 18.6% of
prepended prefixes have unnecessary prepend sizes that increase
their exposure to attacks.
9 FINAL REMARKS
Despite mixed opinions about ASPP in the networking commu-
nity, we find that ASPP is still very present on the Internet, and
its utilization is slightly increasing. Surprised by this, we checked
with operators and found that the main reasons are the simplicity
of ASPP and the fact that it does not have any prerequisites. Our
analysis of ASPP reveals that prepending policies are mostly sta-
ble over time; that ASes are using a wide range of policies when
15We note that the fraction of prepended prefixes whose minimum number of prepends
is zero that has ROAs is similar to the ones in the plot.
announcing their prefixes; and that prepend sizes are becoming
polarized—with either one or more than three prepends.
We unexpectedly spot many ASes uniformly prepending (all)
their prefixes to all neighbors, hence not influencing any remote
routing decision. Via our conversations with operators, we identi-
fied poor housekeeping of BGP configurations, limited knowledge
about BGP, and desire for stability as the possible leading causes.
Our complementary analyses with traceroutes and cross-checks
with CDN data confirm that, the limited visibility of public route
collector projects cannot be the explanation for most of our obser-
vations.
During our interviews, many operators pointed out that using
ASPP suffices to accomplish their ITE goals. Our active measure-
ments confirm that ASPP is effective—since even small prepend
sizes can steer the traffic of multiple routes—if used with many
upstreams. When using only two upstreams, ASPP’s effectiveness
is dependent on the AS location.
We also discuss the security implications of ASPP. First, we show
through active measurements that some ASes remove prepends,
but it appears to be rare at the moment. Second, we find that ASPP
can increase the spread of prefix hijacks, since the hijacked route is
more attractive (than the actual route) to a larger fraction of ASes.
Third, we detect that ASes originate 18% of the prepended prefixes
with unnecessary prepends.
ASPP has value, and ASes are using it extensively on the In-
ternet. However, as Internet paths are getting shorter (as the core
is getting denser), the need for large prepend sizes is decreasing.
Thus, given the security implications of large prepends and the
fact that small prepends are often sufficient for moving traffic, we
recommend network operators to review their prepending policies,
removing unnecessary prepends and using small prepend sizes
when performing ITE.
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A ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
To conduct our study, we relied on active as well as passive measure-
ments. When we used the PEERING testbed to actively announce
prefixes to the Internet, we ensured that we did not overwhelm any
networks by waiting 15 minutes between consecutive announce-
ments. When actively sending traffic from the PEERING testbed, we
ensured not to cause any harm through the following mechanisms:
(i) we sent probing packets at a low rate, i.e., each target IP was
probed with one ICMP, one TCP, and one UDP probe once per
minute. (ii) we avoided traffic bursts by spreading the sending of
probes equally throughout a one-minute interval. (iii) we included
our contact info in the payload of each probe providing details
on how to opt-out of the probing process. We have not received
complaints nor requests to opt-out of the experiments during the
entire duration of our active experiments.
While most of our passive datasets are publicly available, we
cannot share any of the data received from CDNs and the European
IXP for validation purposes. As this limits the possibility for others
to take action based on our results, we tried, whenever possible, to
reach the network operators of ASes that consistently announce
uniform prefixes.
B MONITOR FILTERING
Figure 18 shows the distribution of the fraction of monitors that
observe a given prefix based on all routing information available on
January 15th of each year. While prefix visibility has increased over
the decade, we find a clear separation between two distinct regions
in the plot regardless of the year. On the leftmost side, we have
locally visible prefixes (seen by less than 20% of monitors), and on
the rightmost side, globally visible prefixes (seen by over 80% of
monitors). Based on this finding, we decided to remove all routes to
prefixes observed by less than one-third of all monitors, as indicated
by the threshold line. Notably, picking any other threshold between
0.2 and 0.8 only results in negligible differences.
Figure 18: Fraction of monitors that observe each prefix-
origin pair.























Figure 19: Effectiveness experiment: Timeline and experi-
mental setting (𝑃𝑋 : announcement of prefix 𝑃 with 𝑋 ∈
0, . . . , 3 prepends;𝑊𝑃 : withdraw 𝑃 .
In Figure 19, we depict the timeline of events and the configuration
scenarios from each iteration of our effectiveness experiment. First,
see Scenario𝑇1, we create a baseline by announcing our prefix 𝑃 via
all upstreams without any prepending. After waiting 15 minutes
to allow BGP to converge, we announce 𝑃 with 𝑋 prepends via
the chosen upstreams, see Scenario 𝑇2. After again waiting for 15
minutes to allow BGP to converge, we conclude the setup period
and start a 25-minute probing period. Each probe consists of ICMP,
TCP, and UDP pings triggered once per minute to all targets. To
reduce probing bursts, we spread the packets evenly across the
one-minute time interval. Before the cleanup, we have a 5-minute
break to ensure that the last responses can arrive before we with-
draw the prefix. After the break, we start the cleanup period with
the withdrawal of the announcements in every upstream, see Sce-
nario 𝑇3. To allow for BGP to converge and to minimize the risk of
BGP Route Flap Damping, we wait for 30 minutes before starting a
new iteration.
